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task to write a paper for a conference in Moscou about Cusanus' 
relationship to the Eastern Churches and I recognized how helpful 
and necessary it is io study this collection of documents. 
Young theologians who know enough Latin (or who are will ing to 
learn it) should examine Nicholas of Cusa. It's worth to do it and 
it's also a challenging task, especially for intell igent young people 
with open minds, who are prepared to work hard. There are so 
many things to discover in Cusanus! Most texts have already 
been published in excellent editions and it is now possible to 
analyse and interpret these texts thoroughly. Our understanding 
of these texts is far from being sufficient. Obviously it's also 
important to translate the Latin texts of Nicholas of Gusa 
systematically into the modern languages, particularly in English, 
the global language par excellence. 
A few concluding remarks about the significance of Cusanus 
research: 
What is true with respect to the interpretation of Nicholas of Cusa 
by Rudolf Haubst is also true regarding his interpretation in the 
future: it will be dependent on the "major trends" of theology, 
which can be different in various denominations at the same time. 
At the moment there is a certain tendency (at least in Europe) to 
see Cusanus as the forerunner of postmodern pluralism and 
relativism - the uppermost ideal of many intellectuals. As we all 
know there are some statements of Cusanus which support this 
reading of his texts, but the mainstream of his thinking is neither 
pluralistic nor relativistic. He is stressing the perspeclivity and 
finiteness of human knowledge on the one hand (Cusanus' 
consequence is not scepticism, but tireless search for deeper 
understanding) and the demand of man for divine revelation on 
the other hand. So Cusanus tries lo connect faith and reason, 
theology and philosophy, in very intensive way. He sees faith and 
reason as the two sides of the same coin, which cannot be 
separated without destroying man's desire for understanding, 
fulfilment and enduring happiness. 
Concern ing the relationship between faith and reason we must 
recognize serious deficiencies in our present situation (at least in 
Europe). Pope Benedict XVI said in his famous lecture at the 
University of Regensburg (Sept. 12, 2006) on "Faith, Reason and 
the University . Memories and Reflections': ;'The intention here is 
not one of retrenchment or negative criticism, but of broadening 
our concept of reason and its application. While we rejoice in the 
new possibilities open to humanity, we also see the dangers 
arising from these possibilities and we must ask ourselves how 
we can overcome them. We wi ll succeed in doing so only if 
reason and faith come together in a new way, if we overcome the 
self-imposed limitation of reason to the empiricalty falsifiable, and 
if we once more disclose its vast horizons. In this sense theology 
~igh tl y belongs in the university and within the wide-ranging 
dialogue of sciences, not merely as a historical discipline and one 
of the human sciences, but precisely as theology, as inquiry into 
the rationality of faith. Only thus do we become capable of that 
genuine dialogue of cultures and religions so urgently needed 
today. In lhe Western world it is widely held that only positivistic 
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reason and the forms of philosophy based on it are universally 
valid. Yet the world's profoundly religious cultures see this 
exclusion of the divine from the universality of reason as an attack 
on their most profound convictions. A reason which is deaf to the 
divine and which relegates religion into !he realm of subcultures is 
incapable of entering into the dialogue of cultures." 
The analysis of the Pope of the present state of affa irs is quite 
clear and convincing. But it is not enough to complain about our 
situation . It is necessary to overcome the problems. Cusanus is 
an excellent assistance to do so. His philosophy as well as his 
theology helps us to regain "vast horizons", which we have 
gradually lost in modern times. Of course there is no simple way 
back to the past and studying the texts of an author of the 151h 
century does not automatically solve the difficulties of today. 
Nevertheless it can help "broadening our concept of reason and 
its application", as Pope Benedict states. And it can facilitate 
understanding people from other cultures, who reject the idea of 
exclusively positivistic reason. Therefore research on Nicholas of 
Gusa is not only fascinating and exciting but also valuable for our 
societies and good for our common future in a globalized world. 
I'm looking forward to the next roundtable discussion about this 
issue in 25 years - then celebrating the 501h anniversary of the 
American Cusanus Society in Kalamazoo in the year 2033! 
II. "The Future of Cusanus Research and the Modern 
Legacy of Renaissance Philosophy and Theology'" 
Jason Aleksander, St. Xavier University 
First, I would like to say that I deeply appreciate having been 
asked to speak at this roundtable. Since there are a great many of 
you whose books I have started but haven't finished reading, I 
think it might be appropriate to begin by saying that the future of 
Cusanus research for me will continue to involve researching 
Nicholas of Cusa both in his texts and through yours. 
This being noted, the question that I find especially compell ing in 
the future of Cusanus research occurs in relation to one of the 
more common perspectives on Nicholas of Cusa, and it concerns 
whether and how Nicholas of Cusa's philosophy and theology 
disclose what might be called an epochal threshold between 
premodem and modern European thinking. But, of course, to say 
that this question originates in a common perspective on Nicholas 
of Cusa is not to say that there has ever been or will ever be a 
clear consensus on what would answer the question. 
Be that as it may, to be more precise, the question that compels 
me is not about what makes Nicholas of Gusa a modern thinker 
but about the degree to which dominant concerns of modem 
philosophy are constituted by an often unacknowledged 
• Delivered remarks for a roundtable discussion sponsored by American 
Cusanus Society on "The Future of Cusanus Research" at the 43" International 
Congress or. Medieval Studies, May 8, 2008. 
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relationship to those of Renaissance philosophy and theology. That 
is, rather than interpret Nicholas of Cusa as an untimely Renais-
sance thinker and in light of a tradition or traditions of philosophy 
and science that followed upon the Renaissance, I would hope to 
find in the future of Cusanus research a way of discussing 
modernity's continuities and discontinuities with Renaissance 
philosophy and theology. Or, put differently, I would like to 
investigate what is meant by "modernity" in modern philosophy and 
science-and this is not, I think, the same thing as to investigate 
what is or might be modem about Nicholas of Cusa. 
In light of this ; I would like to make explicit an assumption that I 
believe should limit and motivate such research. Many students of 
Nicholas of Gusa tend to have rather robust opinions on the 
question of his status vis-a-vis medieval and modern philosophy. 
To mention but one of the more widely known views-a view that 
also serves as an index to several others-according to Jasper 
Hopkins, the view that Nicholas of Gusa is a precursor of thinkers 
such as Copernicus, Bruno, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, or 
Einstein is made on the basis of evidence that would justify the 
same claims regarding Maimonides or St. Thomas, claims that 
Hopkins believes to be obviously anachronistic in the latter 
cases.1 It is not necessary, I think, to debate this point in order to 
raise the question that I would like to raise, though I do not wish to 
concede all of its ramifications. In other words, I will accept--: 
indeed, I will even reiterate-the claim that to modernize Nicholas 
of Cusa would be to misunderstand him. 
Or to use an example to illustrate this point, it might certainly be 
possible to see a way in which Spinoza's discussion of the 
Substance-Mode relationship as it pertains to the human capacity 
to engage in intellectual love of God/Substance bears some 
striking simlla rities with Nicholas of Cusa's understanding of the 
contracted immanence of the absolutely infinite in a fin ite human 
being's attempt to love and envision God. But we would not want 
these similarities-as deep or as significant as they may be-to 
encourage the conclusion that Spinoza is really just a 
Renaissance Christian nee-Platonist in disguise any more than 
we would want to suggest that Nicholas of Cusa is really a 
Jewish, anti-Cartesian modern philosopher who flatly denies the 
existence of a free will and also wishes to undertake a radical 
political critique of theology. Instead, the fact that the two thinkers 
share such fundamentally similar views on the varieties of proper 
understandings of the infinite ought to stimulate questions about 
why these understandings differ so drastically in their 
philosophical deployments. 
And yet, I also believe that we must acknowledge that what often 
stands in the way of a fruitful consideration of questions about 
possible continuities between late medieval or Renaissance 
philosophy and modem philosophy or of the influences of late 
medieval and Renaissance philosophers upon their modem 
successors is the assumption that the character of modem 
philosophy is fundamentally discontinuous with that of premodern 
1 See, for instance, A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, (1978), 15. 
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philosophies. In short, the argument that Nicholas of Gusa is no 
more a precursor of any particular modern philosopher than any 
other late medieval or Renaissance philosopher in itself seems to 
me to rest on an assumption that modernity is inaugurated by an 
historical revolution in the habits of thinking that radically severs it 
from prior trad itions of philosophy. Such an assumption does not 
mean that a genealogy of this discontinuity is impossible or that 
such a genealogy would always depend upon anachronism. But 
the assumption that philosophical modernity is inaugurated by an 
historical revolution in the habits of thinking that severs it from 
prior traditions of philosophy does imply that any genealogy of 
modernity that does not admit a fundamental incommensurability 
between modernity and pre-modernity would be open to the 
charge of anachronism.2 I would like to challenge precisely this 
assumption. I believe that it is not only possible but also 
philosophically valuable to undertake a genealogy of modern 
philosophical commitments that attends especially to the 
significance of the modern legacy of Renaissance philosophy. 
Now, why would Cusanus research be especially pertinent to 
such an investigation? Leaving aside the point that it is 
intrinsically valuable to read a thinker of the caliber of Nicholas of 
Gusa and that all thinkers of his caliber are interesting barometers 
of the intellectual needs and capacities of their respective epochs, 
there are some distinct issues and topics with which Nicholas of · 
Gusa was concerned and in relation to which it might be possible 
to undertake an investigation into the question of the modern 
·legacy of Renaissance philosophy and theology. 
If I am to make some suggestions for the future of research in this 
vein, I would like to begin with general characterizations of 
significant discontinuities between modern and premodern habits 
of thinking and in relation to which Cusanus research may 
disclose a moment in the transformation of intellectual habits. A 
laundry list of these discontinuities would include issues which 
have each, in their tum, been put forward as a key (or sometimes 
the key) issue disciosive of or causative of the epochal shift. Such 
a list would include, for instance: (a) the transition from a 
conception of the heterogeneity of being as understood through 
its distinct categories to the regulative principle of the 
homogeneity of matter, including, of course (b} an erosion of the 
distinction between sublunar and supralunar matter as well as (c) 
the inflnitization of the cosmos. This list would go on to include 
also (d) a transition from theological eschatology to modern 
notions of progress, particularly progress as a regulative ideal in 
the sciences; (e) increasing demands for the reducibility of 
sciences to common techniques and principles; and (f) an 
increasing reliance on techniques of mathematical formalization 
for the purposes of description of the natural world . Clearly this is 
2 Consider t~e question also in this light: given such an assumption. tt would not 
come as a surprise that historians of modem philosophy would lend not to be 
concerned with the premodem philosophical developmenis tha'. may have 
shaped the constitutive methods and/or interests of modem philosophy. In fac:, 
mooern philosophy anmunces its own uniqueness from prior modes of thinking 
anc, in so doing, effectively imposes a taboo against the attempt to trace in its 
domir.am features !he legacy of prior traditions. I will return :a \his point in the 
conclusion of this \alk. 
46 
American Cusanus Society Newsletter 
not an exhaustive list of important and meaningful differences 
between modern and pre-modern habits of thinking. As a matter 
of fact, I do no! believe that the investigation of any single issue 
above is going to cut it if we are to attempt to understand the 
general nature of discontinuities between modern and premodern 
habits of thinking. But I do think there are fruitful and less fru itful 
ways of attempting to gather these and other issues together. 
In this vein, I am currently partial to suggestion supplied by Amos 
Funkenstein in his 1986 work Theology and the Scientific 
Imagination (Princeton University Press). In this work, 
Funkenstein suggested that the unfolding of a variety of 
discontinuities such as those mentioned above might, in some 
sense, be gathered together by understanding them as a trend 
towards a secular theological world view. Given the seemingly 
paradoxical nature of his notion of "secular theology ," it should be 
clear that "secular" is used here-pardon the expression-in an 
entirely orthodox sense. That is, throughout the Renaissance, the 
philosophical profession became increasingly practiced in 
universities rather than monasteries, and its concerns became 
increasingly distanced from the explicitly ecclesiological concerns 
that had shaped Western medieval philosophy to a much larger 
degree. But, in this sense, "secular" does not mean materialist, 
atheist, or even non-religious. Rather, as Funkenstein puts it: 
"Theology became 'secularized' in many parts of Europe in the 
original sense of the word: appropriated by laymen" (5). 
Accordingly, concerning the legacy of this secular theology in 
modern science, Funkenstein writes: 
A new and unique approach to matters divine, a secular 
theology of sorts, emerged in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries to a short career. It was secular in 
that it was conceived by laymen for laymen. Galileo and 
Descartes, Leibniz and Newton, Hobbes and Vico were 
eit.her not clergymen at all or did not acquire an 
advanced degree in divinity. They were not professional 
theologians, and yet they treated theological issues at 
length. Their theology was oriented toward the world, ad 
secufum. The new sciences and scholarship, they 
believed, made the traditional modes of theologizing 
obsolete .... ScienGe, philosophy, and theology [were] 
seen as almost one and the same occupation. (3, al! 
emphases in the original). 
In short, then, according to Funkensteir., it is not that the sig-
nifi cant transitions or discontinuities between modem and 
premodern habits of thinking are accomplished through the 
secularization of knowledge claims in general but rather that they 
are brought about, initially at least, through the secularization of 
theological imagination. Specifically, Funkenstein claims that 
these transitions are to be located in epochal shifts in the 
regulative ideals associated with understandings of the divine 
attributes of omnipresence, omnipotence , and benevolence, the 
last of these especially as it relates to the question of divine 
providence. Arid it is in relation to these that it is possible for me 
to return to the question of the future of Cusanus research. 
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First, in relation to the discontinuity that arises between 
moderninty and pre-modernity on the issue of the significance of 
divine omnipresence, I would first want simply to state that I am in 
general agreement with Elizabeth Brient's claim in The 
Immanence of the Infinite (Catholic University of America Press, 
2002) that Nicholas of Cusa's articulation of a philosophy of the 
immanence of the infin ite provides a rich index of an epochal 
transformation in the making. I might also mention that I am 
generally convinced by her criticism that Hans Blumenberg's 
emphasis on nominalism causes him to misidentify how Nicholas 
of Gusa indeed exposes this epochal threshold. That is, to use the 
schema suggested by Funkenstein, Blumenberg seems to try to 
interpret how Nicholas of Gusa contributes to a shift towards a 
secularized understanding of omnipotence rather than , as Brient 
helps us see, a shift in relation to the more relevant question for 
Nicholas of Gusa of omnipresence. In both cases-that of the 
epochal shift in understandings of both omnipresence and 
omnipotence-the issue of the infinite would appear to be crucial, 
but it is in relation to the consequences of the secularization of the 
understanding of omnipresence that Nicholas of Cusa's 
articulation of the immanence of the infinite in the cosmos would 
be more significant for exposing this shift. 
Returning to Funkenstein's schema, the other main area in which 
the future of Cusanus research might help to disclose the modern 
significance of the legacy of premodem thinking concerns the 
attribute of benevolence, especially as it relates to the question of 
divine providence in history. To my knowledge, Nicholas of Cusa 
is explicitly concerned with the issues of time and temporality 
mainly in Dialogus de genesi, De principio, and the third part of 
On Learned lgnorance.3 As might be expected, in general, these 
texts confirm that Nicholas of Cusa's dependence on the notion of 
the immanence of the infinite in created things commits him to a 
philosophy of history that also contracts the immanence of the 
absolutely infin ite and therefore eternal in the infinite but temporal 
unfolding of the cosmos.But, even if he had said nothing explicit 
about the issue it seems to me that Nicholas of Cusa's 
fundamental perspectivalism and its curious presupposition of the 
contracted immanence of the infinite in the cosmos would still 
have provided fruitful ways to unfold an investigation of an 
epochal shift in the understand ing of history. Indeed, there are at 
least two ways in which this issue is pertinent to the future of 
Cusanus research. 
The first way to think about how Nicholas of Cusa indicates an 
epochal shift in the understanding of history is to connect the 
' Ir, De doc/a ignorantia {1440) see especially 111.5-12. Here Nicholas of Gusa is 
concerned not only with the relationship between eternity, immortality, and 
temporality in Christ, bu! also how, through Christ as mediator, human beings are 
perfected and achieve immor.alily. In Dialogus de genesi (1447), see especially 
par\ II in which Nicholas of Cusa discusses how infinite (imrreasurabie) duration 
is relatec to the Eternal Absolute Same which is its only adequate measure. In De 
pn'ncipio (1459), the point that Nicholas cf Gusa discusses in relation to in rela tion 
to a varieri of textual sources concerning the question of Creation is that the One 
Beginning (the Beginning of Beginning in Eternity) is exalted and uncontracted 
and gathers into itself (enfolds) the multitude of existing things. By the same 
token, multitude is a contacted/contractible oneness as cniy a representation of 
revelation oi Absolute Oneness. 
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issue of the temporal unfolding of the cosmos with the temporal 
unfolding of human beings' attempts to understand the cosmos. In 
this sense, what Nicholas of Cusa provides is an understanding of 
history that presupposes the infinite unity of that which human 
beings strive to understand adequately but perennially fail to 
accomplish from the singular, fin ite perspectives possible for them 
as singular, finite beings. I think, then, that Brient is probably right 
that such a view has something important to tell us about an 
epochal shift towards a regulative ideal of adequate knowledge 
that implicitly endorses a notion of scientific progress towards an 
infinitely deferred but presupposed unitary understanding of the 
cosmos. Thus, viewed in the light of a modem legacy of Nicholas 
of Gusa, we may see that the success of this scientific activity 
according to the regulative ideal of what we might call a 
phi/osophia perennis is in its progress both despite and in relation 
to the recalcitrance of the world to a fully adequate understanding 
of it. 
The second way in which Cusanus research might disclose a new 
direction in the development of modem philosophies of history 
concerns his understanding of the necessity of a presupposition 
of the unity of faith as a guiding regulative ideal for the endeavor 
to understand the wortd. In relation to this point, the text that I 
think can be particularly fruitful is the De pace fidei in which 
Nicholas of Cusa offers what he takes to be a convincing 
demonstration of the ways in which the diversity of religious ri tes 
necessarily presupposes both the unity of a single true faith and 
the possibil ity-again, perennially deferred--0f achieving a lasting 
religious harmony. In this text especially, I think we can find a 
resource for investigating ways in which modem philosophies of 
history {e.g ., those of Kant or Hegel) often remain tacitly wedded 
to an understanding of the teleology of history that is distinctly 
Christian despite their cla ims to understand the universal features 
of historical processes. 
I will end with this point because it is the one in relation to which I 
might more forcefully make clear what I think the future of 
Cusanus research might offer in relation to the general question 
of the modern legacy of Renaissance philosophy and theology. In 
short, it seems to me that although modem philosophy and 
science both insist on the irrelevance of the empirical experience 
of personal revelation in the investigation and production of 
knowledge, they nonetheless retain the regulative ideals of the 
heritage of Renaissance Christian theology. In light of this, it 
would not be a mistake to understand the general intellectual 
character of the Enlightenment, for instance, as largely guided by 
an imperative always to challenge the legitimacy of "faith--
understood in the context of personal revelation-as an access to 
truth. Accordingly, then, I do acknowledge a significant gap 
between modem thinking and that of Nicholas of Gusa. However, 
I also maintain that there are ways in which this gap can and 
should be understood as bridged. And the ways in which modem 
philosophies of history ofte tend to involve an immanent 
universal teleology would be a sign of this. 
To wrap up, the kinds of questions I would find most compefling in 
the future of Cusanus research are those which would challenge 
the uniqueness of modem philosophical conceptions of reason 
Volume XX>/, Number 1 July 2008 
that understand it to be a strictly secular human enterprise that 
obtains or constructs non-theologically grounded knowledge of 
the organization of the cosmos and/or of a universal plan of 
human history. Or to restate this more precisely, it is the 
significance of reason's secular character according to these 
varieties of modem philosophy that might fruitfully be put in 
question by the future of Cusanus research. 
Specifically, to the extent that Nicholas of Gusa is a part of a 
modern legacy of Renaissance philosophy and theology (and to 
the extent that this legacy is to be made part of a program for the 
future of Cusanus research) , his role in this legacy may help to 
expose the degree to which "modern" conceptions of reason 
remain wedded to the constitutive dimensions of their particularty 
Christian theological heritage. That is, to put this as succinctly as 
possible, if I am right that what Cusanus research may help to 
disclose for us is the degree to which modem philosophy 
operates largely in the same intellectual space as Renaissance 
philosophy or at least in relation to the same crises of 
Renaissance philosophy, then what would still be required if 
modem philosophy were to live up to its own perennial insistence 
on its own legitimacy and uniqueness would be to engage in self-
criticism in light of a recognition of its continual disavowal of the 
modern legacy of Renaissance philosophy and the historical 
predominance of its Christian theology. 
Ill. "The Future of Cusanus Studies 
• Some Proposals" 
Clyde Lee Miller, State University 





First of all , I would like to express my appreciation for the invitation 
to join this panel and my deep regard for my co-panelists, Prof. 
Euler and Prof. Aleksander, and for their work. As I thought about 
being on this panel, I realized that no one, induding myself, has 
ever thought of me as a prophet. Even so, I will not hesitate to 
make at least one prediction about the future of Cusanus studies, 
say for the next fifty years. Looking back at the last fifty years, I 
predict that, barring some social or ecological global catastrophe, 
we can expect that to see that Cusanus studies will bring us more 
of the same: conferences, papers, monographs, translations, 
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